Whatever may have been in the minds of the committee that wrote it, the word was sent forth into the world ambiguous and undefined.
There are strong indications that the early federal judges believed that "laws" included the decisions of state courts, but the picture is not entirely clear. It was early held that state rules affecting property rights and decisions interpreting statutes would be followed. 8 The Supreme Court in 1834 said that "there can be no common law of the United States." 9 State law was in at least one case expressly followed on a non-property question, but Justice Chase noted that he concurred only because the general common law was the same°I n 1842 the famous case of Swift v. Tyson" settled the question-though not the argument-for the next ninety-six years. Justice Story, who wrote the opinion, held that the New York law of negotiable instruments need not be followed by a federal court, because that law was not founded upon statute or local usage, but was deduced from the general common law. The word "laws" in Section 34 did not include state decisions. "They are, at most," he wrote, "only evidence of what the laws are, and are not of themselves laws.' 2 In the fields of contracts and commercial instruments the federal courts were free to discover the law "in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence."'" Thus was born a doctrine which during its long career was to evoke a host of learned articles, impassioned dissents, and as impassioned judicial apologiaeY 4 The doctrine of general law was extended far beyond contracts and commercial paper. 5 It became settled that the only cases in which a federal court was bound to follow state decisions were those in which a state statute, a settled local rule of property, or a "local custom" was involvedY 1 Even in these three categories there were broad exceptions. In x863, in Gelpce v. Dubuque,' the Supreme Court held that, where rights had accrued under a state decision sustaining the validity of a state statute, federal courts were free to ignore a subsequent state decision overruling the first. This doctrine, in its implications inconsistent with the judicial philosophy which underlay Swift v. Tyson, '" in prac8NMcKeen In diversity cases, the inevitable result of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson and its progeny was widespread "forum shopping," especially by corporations. Merely because of diversity of citizenship a party could, by suing in federal court, or by removal of an action against him, obtain a result different from that ordained by the law of the state in which the cause of action arose. 23 In non-diversity cases also, state-created rights had one set of consequences in state courts, another in federal courts.
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There was powerful judicial dissent from the doctrine. Justice Field expressed the fervent hope that it, "like other errors, will, in the end 'die among its worshipers.' "25 Justice Holmes vigorously attacked its extension and particular applications, denying that "there is one august corpus, to understand which clearly is the only task of any Court concerned."
2
The merits of the doctrine were hotly debated by legal writers. It was attacked as allowing federal courts to control a field over which Congress had no power to legislate, 2 as failing to promote the promised uniformity, 2 8 and as historically inaccurate.
20
It was defended as promoting uniformity and as giving lawyers a nation-wide basis of prediction," 0 as the rightful exercise of an equal and independent judicial power, 3 ' and as the means for the enforcement of rights which had an existence independent of those enforced by state courts. The question for decision is whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift P. Tyson shall now be disapproved. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or "general," be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts. Justice Reed would not go so far as to agree that in applying Swift v. Tyson the federal courts had been guilty of almost a century of unconstitutional conduct 3 8 The constitutional holding was not necessary to the decision; it was perhaps advanced to overcome the objection that Congress had by long acquiescence adopted Story's interpretation of Section 34.
Thus did the era of "general law" come to an end. One method of meeting the fundamental problem posed by the existence in our federal system of two systems of courts with concurrent jurisdiction had been tried and rejected. The basis of the new approach was laid down, but it still remained for the courts to define its full implications and extent. II
Although it was in suits between citizens of different states that the doctrines of both Swift v. Tyson and Erie Railroad v. Tompkins have received their greatest emphasis, neither of these decisions was by its terms limited solely to diversity cases. Prior to c938, federal courts held themselves free to make an independent determination of the law applicable to state-created rights whenever the question was one of "general law," regardless of the manner in which jurisdiction was acquired 3 9 " Mutual Life Insurance Co. v Since the Erie case, state decisional law must be followed by federal courts whenever a state-created right is involved, whatever may be the basis of jurisdiction 4 This was made apparent by the Supreme Court in 1939, in Wichita Royalty Co. v. City National Bank. ' The district court had jurisdiction by reason of the fact that the case was concerned with winding up the affairs of a national bank. 42 The Court held, on the authority of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, that a state decision on the right to fasten a special trust upon a fund in the hands of a receiver must be followed by the federal court. Before the Erie case, this question had been held to be one of "general law."
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In the final analysis, of course, the federal courts still determine when state decisional law will be followed, since the characterization of a right as "state-created" or "federally created" is itself a federal question. 4 But once it has been determined that the right is one created by a state, and not by the federal government, a federal court must follow state decisional law, regardless of how it acquired jurisdiction. III Mr. Tompkins was walking beside the Erie Railroad tracks in the state of Pennsylvania when an object protruding from the doorway of a boxcar knocked him into judicial immortality. He brought suit in a federal district court in New York. While Mr. Justice Brandeis apparently assumed that the law of Pennsylvania rather than that of New York was controlling, he did not elucidate the steps in the process by which that conclusion was reached.
Under Swift v. Tyson, of course, such typical conflict-of-laws problems were obviated to the extent that "general law" was applied. Since "general law" would be followed no choice was necessary in many cases. When a determination was necessary, it was the general view that the choice of the proper law was itself a matter for independent determination by the federal courts, although there had been no direct holding on this point by the Supreme Court. 43 In 1941, settling a conflict among circuits, the Supreme Court held in the Klaxon 4 " case that under Erie Railroad v. Tompkins a district court must follow the choice-oflaw rules of the state in which it sits. Justice Reed in his opinion said:
Any other ruling would do violence to the principle of uniformity within a state upon ' 0 The occasional statement that the rule of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins applies only to cases of diversity is not accurate. The error arises from confusing those cases in which the right is a federal one with those in which the right is a state one. See Shackelford v. Latchum, 52 F. Supp. 205 (1943) , where the court assigned this reason for not following state rule as to parol evidence in suit to recover federal income taxes. which the Tompkins decision is based. Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal courts in different states is attributable to our federal system which leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors. 4 8 On the same day the Court further emphasized the application of the Erie doctrine to conflicts cases in Griffin v. McCoach 4 in which it held that the district court is bound by the public policy of the state in which it sits. One important question in the field of conflicts which is suggested by the Erie case has as yet had no answer from the courts. Does the doctrine of the Klaxon case govern conflicts cases where one of the contacts is with a foreign nation? New York,t' for example, has held that it will not follow Hilton v. Guyot 5 1 on tie recognition of foreign judgments. Does the Erie doctrine require a federal court sitting in New York to follow the state rule? Or is this, because of its close relation to foreign policy, a "federal field," in which state courts not only cannot bind the federal courts, but are themselves bound to follow federal decisional law?
"2 IV -While the substantive law applied by federal courts to state-created rights prior to 1938 was governed by Swift v. Tyson, "procedure" in federal courts was prescribed by the Conformity Act," which provided that practice and procedure in the federal district courts should conform, "as near as may be," to that of the courts of the state in which the federal tribunal sat.
On June 19, 1934, Congress gave the Supreme Court power to prescribe general rules of procedure for the district courts in civil actions. 4 A distinguished committee of legal scholars and practitioners was appointed by the Court to draft the new rules, which were adopted by the Court on December 30, 1937.88 .-The Supreme Court was forbidden by Congress to affect any "substantive" rights by adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure." The inclusion of certain matters in the Rules apparently indicated that in the opinion of the Supreme Court they were "procedural." Four months later the Erie case declared that in certain types of cases the federal courts must determine the "substantive" rights of the parties according to state law. This'posed the question, What is to happen if a rule of state law is so closely bound up with the question of recovery or non-recovery that 48 313 U. S. at 496 (941). under the Erie doctrine it might well be labeled "substantive," and yet the matter is one of those provided for by the Rules?" There are two possible solutions to the problem. First, it may be concluded that provision for a matter in the Rules is a determination by the Supreme Court that the matter is "procedural" and state law is not binding. Second, it may be recognized" that since the decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins the prior determination by the Supreme Court is no longer conclusive in situations governed by the doctrine of that case.
At bottom the question is one of policy. It is necessary to balance the Erie, doctrine against the policy underlying the Federal Rules. The line between "substance" and "procedure" must be drawn at a point which will carry out the policy chosen, and classifications perhaps valid for other purposes must be rejected S--the same process for which Professor Cook has so cogently argued in the field of conflict: of laws. 09 In an increasing number of cases the federal courts have taken the second course suggested above, and have found the policy of the Erie case to be the weightier, as indicated by the cases considered below.
The rule which first raised the problem was 8(c), which provides for affirmative defenses, including contributory negligence. Prior to 1938, when the Erie case was decided and the rules were adopted, the federal rule was that the burden of proof of contributory negligence was "substantive" and a question of "general law" under The same type of problem is raised by Rule 2 3 (b), which provides that, in order to maintain a shareholder's derivative suit, the plaintiff must have been a shareholder at the time of the transaction complained of, or have acquired his shares since that time by operation of law. "In a conflict-of-laws case, two separate characterizations may be necessary: first, to determine whether the Erie doctrine requires that the law of the state be applied, and second, to determine the characterization which the state of the forum would make for conflict-of-laws purposes. Among the states there is a wide split of authority on this requirement. 0 3 The federal rule is a continuation of Equity Rule 27, the history of which leaves in doubt whether it was regarded as "substantive" or "procedural."" The Supreme Court had held-in 19o8, however, that the lack of such a showing deprived the plantiff of standing in a court of equity." ' The question has been raised in a number of lower federal courts. Most of them have noted apparent conflict with the Erie doctrine, but have deferred to the authority of the Rules, 6 have avoided deciding because the state rule was the same,G 7 or have merely commented upon the fact, without considering it."' At least one court has held the matter to be "substantive," and governed by state law,"' and another has as flatly rejected this view." .The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules recently considered the advisability of amending Rule 2 3 (b), but concluded that the question should be left to be determined by the Supreme Court when and if a case comes before it.
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It would seem that the requirement of Rule 2 3 (b) does affect "substantive" rights for the purposes of the Erie doctrine, and state law should govern. Otherwise a plaintiff who cannot qualify under the federal rule, but who could maintain the suit under the state rule, could be defeated by removal, merely because of diversity of citizenship.
-Rule 43 makes admissible all evidence which is admissible under any federal statute, or which was admissible under the old equity practice, or which is admissible in the courts of the state in which the federal court sits. That rule which favors admissibility is to be preferred.
Prior to* -939,, matters of evidence depended upon the Competency of Witnesses Act, 2 the Rules of Decision Act, 73 and the Conformity Act. 74 There was some conflict as to which governed particular matters, and -there was disagreement as to whether or not state decisional law of evidence was binding upon federal courts. 7 There have been cases holding that the state rule as to judicial notice of foreign law will "govern, 2 but it would seem that the better view is to thecontrary, 3 since judicial notice of foreign law merely relieves one of the parties from the burden of proving it, and does not necessarily change the result. Outside the area covered by the Federal Rules, questions of "substance" and "procedure" are encountered in applying the doctrines of forum non conveniens and "internal affairs." 8 4 These doctrines have become so intertwined and present so many features in common that they may be considered together for purposes of discussion of their application under the Erie case. The Supreme Court has three times avoided ruling whether or not the Erie case requires a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction to follow the state law in these cases 85 8 7 held that state law should govern the application of forum non conveniens, and clearly stated the reasons for that conclusion. He pointed out that a purpose of the Eric doctrine was to avoid a different result because of diversity, and that this "extends as much to determining whether the court shall act at all, as to how it shall decide, if it does." The essence of diversity jurisdiction is that a federal court enforces State law and State policy. If North Carolina has authoritatively announced that deficiency judgments can. not be secured within its borders, it contradicts the presuppositions of diversity jurisdiction for a federal court in that State to give such a deficiency judgment.... A federal court in North Carolina, when invoked on grounds of diversity of citizenship, cannot give that which North Carolina has withheld.
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While there was another ground of decision-that the judgment in a prior suit between the same parties in the state courts, in which the highest state court held that the state courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the cause of action, was res judicataJustice Frankfurter for the majority placed great stress upon denial of jurisdiction through the operation of the Erie doctrine.
It had already been pointed out by the Court that the Erie case did more than overrule Swift v. Tyson-that it also overruled "a particular way of looking at law which dominated the judicial process long after its inadequacies had been laid bare." 4 Angel v. Bullington would seem to follow logically from this major premise. If the federal court in diversity cases is able to entertain a cause of action which cannot be heard by the courts of the state in which it sits, then suit in a federal court would produce a different result, merely because of the "accident of diversity." The federal equity jurisdiction is said to be identical in extent with that of the English Court of Chancery at the time of the Revolution. 5 It has been repeatedly held that state laws cannot increase or diminish this jurisdiction by creating or abolishing remedies 6 A state may, however, create new "substantive" rights which may be enforced in federal courts of equity. 7 If the state at the same time prescribes a remedy to enforce the right, and the remedy is substantially consistent with ordinary modes of procedure, then federal courts may give such remedy."' All of the foregoing is subject to the statutory requirement that suits in equity shall not be sustained where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law. 9 The remedy at law must be one available in the federal court, and not merely in the state courts.' 00 Federal equity jurisdiction is further circumscribed by the constitutional requirement of trial by jury in actions traditionally legal.'
Although the Rules of Decision Act by its terms applied only-to "trials at common law," the Supreme Court had declared that the enactment was merely declaratory of existing law, and did not by implication exclude equity cases; 102 and, by reasoning analogous to that in Swift v. Tyson, federal courts were freed from dependence on the pronouncements of state courts as rules of decision in equity cases as well. Prior to 1938 federal courts were as free to disregard state decisional law in equity as in cases at law.' 0 3
In the Ruhlin case,' 0 4 decided within a week after Erie v. Tompkins, the Supreme Court applied the new doctrine to a question arising in an equity case. It did not hold, however, that equitable questions were governed by the Erie doctrine, but only that when in an equity case a question arose which would have been one of "general" law prior to the Erie case, state law must now be followed. The same cautious approach was used in the next equity case decided, Cities Service Oil v. Dunlap, 0 " in which the Court held that the burden of proof of bona fide purchase in an action to quiet tide was "substantive," and not merely a matter of equity practice, and state law must be followed.
Having once avoided the problem of the application of the Erie doctrine to an exclusively equitable question,' the Court in 1945 met the issue squarely in Guaranty Trust Company v. York3. 7 It held that the state statute of limitations should be applied in a class suit for breach of trust. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the opinion, first reiterated traditional ideas of equity jurisdiction, and said that state law cannot define the remedies which a federal equity court may afford in diversity jurisdiction. But, he continued, it was immaterial whether statutes of limitation be classified as "substantive" or "procedural":
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins was not an endeavor to formulate scientific legal terminology. It expressed a policy that touches vitally the proper distribution of judicial power between state and federal courts. In essence the intent of that decision was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.' rights that have no federal origin. ' " 0 If the policy underlying the Erie doctrine is as compelling as this language implies, must not equitable remedies which are available in state courts be available in federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction if the lack of such remedies would lead to a different result in the federal courts?
The scope of the York decision is not clear, especially since the decision in Angel v. Bulling-ton, which established that, in some measure at least, the jurisdiction of federal courts in diversity jurisdiction is dependent upon state law. It would seem at least arguable that the traditional statements of federal equity jurisdiction in diversity cases are no longer entirely valid."' VII Before Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, federal courts were free to disregard state decisions under certain circumstances although the case was not one which fell into the category of "general law." When a state decision had been rendered subsequent to the judgment of a lower federal court, but pending appeal, federal judges were not bound to follow the latest decision,". although they sometimes did so.
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When a state decision invalidated contract rights previously held to be valid, federal courts were free to ignore the subsequent decisionY" 4 The A state is not without law save as its highest court has declared it. There are many rules of decision commonly accepted and acted upon by the bar and inferior courts which are nevertheless laws of the state although the highest court of the state has never passed upon them. In those circumstances a federal court is not free to reject the state rule merely because it has not received the sanction of the highest state court, even though it thinks the rule is unsound in principle or another is preferable. The policy underlying Erie Railroad v. Tompkins does not require that in the absence of state authority federal courts achieve mathematical identity with what a state court may in the future declare to be the law of the state. To achieve such a result would require the services of clairvoyants rather than judges. Any incongruity in the individual case arising from the fact that a federal court decides the rights of the parties upon the assumption that the state law is one way, and the state courts later, and in another case, decide that the principle is to the contrary, is inherent in a federal system providing for dual courts with concurrent jurisdiction. When the state court does speak, the federal court must follow. Until that time, the most that a federal judge can do is, as Judge Parker puts it:
... to consider that question in the light of the common law of the state, with a view of reaching the decision which reason dictates, and with the faith that the local court will reach the same decision when the question comes before it.' This case served to emphasize the fact that, as before Erie, 4 4 there are "federal fields," governed by "federal common law." There are cases to which, because'an interest of the United States is involved, 42 , because of the sweep of a federal
